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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred Bv Finding The Officer's Conduct In Detaining Ashworth
Constitutionallv Unreasonable
A.

Introduction
Police officers, with information from two citizens that Ashworth was highly

inebriated and information from one citizen confirmed by other information that
he had been driving, entered an Alcoholics Anonymous (hereinafter "AA)
meeting held in a community center to detain Ashworth. (R., pp. 5, 55-56; Tr., p.
10, L. 8 - p. 18, L. 25; p. 22, L. 25 - p. 28, L. 18.) The district court found that
Ashworth enjoyed a privacy expectation such that it violated the Fourth
Amendment for the officers to pursue him into the AA meeting absent a warrant
or an applicable warrant exception. (R., pp. 59-60.) The district court also
determined that there were no exigent circumstances because lack of personal
observation of intoxication prevented a finding of probable cause. (R., pp. 6062.) The state has challenged both of these determinations. (Appellant's brief,
pp. 5-1 1.)
In response, Ashworth argues that he proved he had a subjective
expectation of privacy because the name of the group holding the meeting was
Alcoholics Anonvmous, the meeting was "held behind closed doors," and the
district court was probably aware of information appellate counsel found on the
internet. (Respondent's brief, pp. 10-13.) Ashworth does not argue that the
district court's determination that there was no probable cause was correct, but
instead argues that existing precedent regarding what constitutes an exigency
should be overruled. (Respondent's brief, pp. 14-26.) Ashworth's arguments

lack merit. Review of the record and application of the correct legal standards to
the record show that Ashworth presented no evidence of a subjective
expectation of privacy and that the facts do not establish that any subjective
expectation of privacy was what society would consider reasonable. Likewise,
Ashworth's arguments that dissipation of BAC evidence for a DUI does not
create an exigency are contrary to the precedents of the ldaho appellate courts
and the Supreme Court of the United States.
B.

The District Court Erred In Findinq Anv Privacy Interests Protected Bv The
Fourth Amendment
An expectation of privacy does not give rise to the protections of the

Fourth Amendment unless the following criteria are met: (1) the defendant
manifests a subjective expectation of privacy in the area searched or seized, and
(2) society is willing to accept the defendant's expectation of privacy as

objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Smith v. Marvland, 442 U.S.
735, 740 (1979); State v. Wilkins, 125 ldaho 215, 222, 868 P.2d 1231, 1238
(1994). The test of legitimacy is not whether the individual chooses to conceal

assertedly "private" activity but whether the government's intrusion infringes upon
the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment. Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182-83 (1984). The defendant has the threshold
burden of demonstrating that his legitimate privacy interests were infringed by
the challenged governmental action. Rawlinas v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104
(1980); State v. Holland, 135 ldaho 159, 162, 15 P.3d 1167, ? 170 (2000).

"What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection." Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). Thus, a police officer's observations made from a
location open to the public do not constitute a search under the Fourth
Amendment, because the Fourth Amendment protects only reasonable
expectations of privacy and one can have no reasonable expectation of privacy
in what is knowingly exposed to public view. State v. Christensen, 131 Idaho
143, 146-47, 953 P.2d 583, 586-87 (1998).
In this case Ashworth presented no evidence to establish either prong of
the privacy test. He presented no evidence that he had a subjective expectation
that the AA meeting was not open to the public. If any private citizen could have
walked into and joined that meeting, then society would not recognize an
expectation that the meeting was private as reasonable. Because the evidence,
if anything, established that the AA meeting was open to the public,' Ashworth
failed to establish that entry into that room where the meeting was being held
intruded on grounds protected by the Fourth Amendment.
Ashworth argues that the very nature of the AA meeting conveyed a
reasonable expectation that what was said at the meeting would be held
confidential, and therefore he had a reasonable expectation of privacy.
(Respondent's brief, pp. 10-14.)

Even assuming the truth of the factual

underpinnings of this argument, it is irrelevant.

Because Ashworth had no

' The district court apparently so found. (R., p. 59 ("the meeting occurred in a
place open to the public").)
3

reasonable expectation that the public was denied access to that room and that
meeting, he had no reasonable expectation that he was not in a "public place"
where an arrest or investigative detention could not take place.

See State v.

Coma, 133 ldaho 29, 981 P.2d 754 (Ct. App. 1999) (arrest can be made in
"public place"); State v. Wren, 115 ldaho 618, 768 P.2d 1351 (Ct. App. 1989)
( ~ a m e ) .The
~ district court's determination that "participants [in an AA meeting]
are free from prosecution and recrimination arising from their participation" (R., p.
59) is factually erroneous and legally irrelevant.

Officers did not violate

Ashworth's privacy by walking into the meeting because any other member of the
public could have done so.
C.

Dissipation Of BAC Evidence Created An Exiaency
Even if the Fourth Amendment applied to the officers' actions those

actions were constitutionally reasonable.

Probable cause to believe that

Ashworth had been driving under the influence immediately prior to entering the
AA meeting created an exigent circumstance due to the destruction of evidence
of his BAC by the body's natural processes of eliminating alcohol from the
system. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); State v. Robinson, 144
ldaho 496, 163 P.3d 1208 (Ct. App. 2007). Because the officers had probable
cause to believe that Ashworth had driven drunk immediately prior to the AA

The state relies on its opening brief for its argument that the district court
applied an incorrect legal standard when it required the state to prove that
Ashworth did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. (Appellant's brief,
pp. 4-6.)

meeting, their actions in entering and detaining Ashworth for investigation was
constitutionally justified.
Ashworth does not actively contend that the officers lacked probable
cause. Instead, he argues as an alternative basis for the district court's ruling
that the state should be required to establish exactly how long it would have
taken to secure a warrant and that precedent finding dissipation of BAC
evidence in DUI cases should be overruled. (Respondent's brief, pp. 14-26.)
These arguments lack merit.
1.

The Evidence Established An Exigency

Ashworth argues that there was no exigency because "it may very well be
that the officers in this case could have secured a warrant within a matter of just
a few minutes."

(Respondent's brief, p. 17.)

Review of the record and

application of the correct legal standards shows that Ashworth's contention is
without merit.
The evidence in this case establishes that the officers contacted Ashworth
at about 8:00 p.m. on May 5, 2008, in Weippe, Clearwater County, Idaho. (Tr.,
p. 5, Ls. 3-10; p. 11, L. 3 - p. 16, L. 3.) The law provides that a search warrant
must be in writing. I.C. 33 19-4401, 19-4407. The person seeking the warrant
must submit an affidavit of probable cause. I.C.

3

19-4403. The warrant itself

must be issued by a judge, usually a magistrate. I.C.

$3

19-4401, 19-4406.

Clearwater county has a single magistrate, in Orofino. (DeskBook Directory
Idaho State Bar 2009-2010, p. 184.) If the warrant is obtained by telephone, the

proceedings must be recorded and transcribed, and a duplicate original warrant
must be prepared. I.C. § 19-4404.
Ashworth's speculation that a search warrant meeting these legal
qualifications could ever be obtained in ''just a few minutes" is on its face
unreasonable. That officers could have done so in rural Clearwater County at
8:00 in the evening in that amount of time is preposterous. The officers would
have had to draft an affidavit and a search warrant and print it, find a magistrate
in another town after business hours, deliver the documents to the magistrate
and get the warrant issued (or arrange for recording of a telephonic warrant
application), return to Weippe and serve the warrant.

It would have been

impossible to do this in an amount of time that would not result in substantial loss
of evidence. Given that a test resulting in a BAC of less than 0.08 would have
been an absolute bar to prosecution, I.C. 3 18-8004(2), any reduction in the BAC
was of potentially enormous significance.
There is no question here but that evidence was being destroyed by
Ashworth's normal bodily processes. The evidence also demonstrates that the
time was in the evening in rural Clearwater County. The very process the
officers would have had to undertake to secure a warrant under these
circumstances shows that obtaining a warrant would have put the state's ability
to gather the relevant and necessary evidence at risk. State v. Woolery, 116
ldaho 368, 370, 775 P.2d 1210, 1212 (1989); State v. Worthinston, 138 ldaho
470, 472, 65 P.3d 211, 213 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Coo~er,136 Idaho 697,
701, 39 P.3d 637, 641 (Ct. App. 2001); State v. Curtis, 106 ldaho 483, 489, 680

P.2d 1383, 1389 (Ct. App. 1984).

The circumstances were exigent, and

Ashworth's base speculation fails to show otherwise.
2.

Ashworth's Request To Overturn Established Precedent Should Be
Reiected

ldaho jurisprudence requires respect for its own precedent. The rule of
stare decisis dictates that controlling precedent be followed "unless it is
manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or
unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and
remedy continued injustice." State v. Dana, 137 ldaho 6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768
(2002); State v. Humphews, 134 ldaho 657, 660, 8 P.3d 652, 655 (2000)
(quoting Houahland Farms. Inc. v. Johnson, 119 ldaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978,
983 (1990)); see also State v. Guzman, 122 ldaho 981, 1001,842 P.2d 660,680
(1992) ("[Plrior decisions of this Court should govern unless they are manifestly
wrong or have proven over time to be unjust or unwise."); State v. Odiaqa, 125
ldaho 384, 388, 871 P.2d 801, 805 (1994) ("Having previously decided this
question, and being presented with no new basis upon which to consider the
issue, [the court must be] guided by the principle of stare decisis to adhere to the
law as expressed in [its] earlier opinions."); State v. Card, 121 ldaho 425, 44052, 825 P.2d 1081, 1096-1108 (1991) (McDevitt, J., specially concurring). This
Court should therefore follow the precedent of State v. Fees, 140 ldaho 81, 90
P.3d 306 (2004), and State v. Robinson, 144 ldaho 496, 163 P.3d 1208 (Ct. App.

2007), holding that the exigent circumstances exception applies to home entries
if the underlying offense is jailable, and not just violent or a felony.'
Ashworth argues that Fees and Robinson were wrongly decided, and that
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984)' requires a "totality of the
circumstances" test that will rarely justify a home entry for misdemeanors under
the exigent circumstances exception. (Respondent's brief, pp. 18-26.)

Fees and

Robinson, however, distinguish Welsh for the same reasons the Supreme Court
of the United States distinguished Welsh in Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326,
334-36 (2001).

m,140 ldaho at 86-88, 90 P.3d at 311-13; Robinson, 144

ldaho at 500-01, 163 P.3d at 1212-13. Ashworth instead requests this Court to
rely on Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752 (gthCir., 2009), an opinion that does
not even admit the existence of the McArthur decision by the Supreme Court.
The Idaho courts follow the "vast majority of jurisdictions rejecting the bright line
felony rule." Robinson, 144 ldaho at 500-501, 163 P.3d at 1212-13. Ashworth
has failed to show that this Court should overrule established precedent that
interprets Supreme Court precedent the same way the Supreme Court does.

The state notes that the exigent circumstances exception here at issue has
long justified a search and seizure in the form of a blood draw. State v. Woolery,
116 ldaho 368, 370, 775 P.2d 1210, 1212 (1989); State v. Worthinclton, 138
ldaho 470, 472, 65 P.3d 211, 213 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Cooper, 136 ldaho
697, 701, 39 P.3d 637, 641 (Ct. App. 2001); State v. Curtis, 106 ldaho 483,489,
680 P.2d 1383, 1389 (Ct. App. 1984). The issue addressed in Fees and
Robinson was whether such an exception justified a home entry. The state
notes that the police did not enter Ashworth's home, making Ashworth's
argument that these cases should be overruled even less relevant.

The officers in this case had probable cause to believe that Ashworth had
very recently committed a DUI and that he was currently in an AA meeting in a
public building where his body was naturally metabolizing the alcohol in his
blood. This created an exigency that justified entry to order Ashworth to step out
of the meeting and undergo evidentiary testing to establish his being under the
influence and his BAC level. The district court erred to hold otherwise.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's
order suppressing evidence and remand for further proceedings.
DATED this 5'h day of October, 2009.
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